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readings of Paul still persist in the present
volume, and demarcate a site of struggle
between modern interpreters. On the one side
of this struggle are those who use Paul’s
letters and the postcolonial posture as ciphers
for their own political engagements—
scholarship and political action melded
together. Examples in the collection can be
found in the emphasis on an “ethics of interpretation” (p. 174), the plea to the “Christian
Occident” to “renounce its complicity in the
colonial and neo-colonial enterprise” (p. 222),
and the “lessons that Christianity must learn
from Marxism” (p. 50). For theologians and
scholars of Paul in theological seminaries and
divinity schools this politically interested
approach is expected. On the other side of the
struggle are scholars of religion in universities
for whom this politically engaged approach is
regarded as unacceptable, and considered
symptomatic of a broader problem in the field
of biblical studies, namely, theology masking
as objective scholarship. A book review is not
the place to adjudicate this issue, except to say
that postcolonial criticism can be pulled in
either direction: as another interpretive tool to
mine Paul’s letters as historical data; or, as
another interpretive tool to mine Paul’s letters
for homiletic insights. The two are very
different.
David A. Kaden
Department for the Study of Religion
University of Toronto
david.kaden@mail.utoronto.ca

Existence and The Good: Metaphysical
Necessity in Morals and Politics. Written by
Franklin I. Gamwell. Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 2012. x + 209 pages. ISBN
1438435924. $24.95 US, $24.95 CDN.
Existence and the Good: Metaphysical
Necessity in Morals and Politics, the latest

book by University of Chicago Professor
Emeritus Franklin I. Gamwell, reaffirms and
enhances the process theologian’s reputation
for analytic power and systematic clarity in
service of democracy and human rights. The
text—in many ways a comprehensive
synthesis of Gamwell’s previous projects—
seeks to demonstrate that one cannot identify
and justify the existence and nature of the
human good, including the goods of human
rights and democracy, without engaging in
metaphysics.
Gamwell commences by identifying and
scrutinizing three foundational theories of
morality that, on his reading, all fail to
provide a rationally-warranted conception of
the good: (1) liberal theories that uphold the
existence of universal reason yet reject the
possibility of metaphysical inquiry and thus
the derivation of morality from the nature of
existence itself; (2) classical metaphysical
theories that uphold the possibility of deriving
a principle of the good from the nature of
reality as such, yet allow for the identification
of the good by means of negation; and (3)
post-modern theories that reject the possibility
of universal reason altogether and, thus, the
existence of a universal good at all. Gamwell
sees Immanuel Kant as paradigmatically
representing the first category, St. Thomas
Aquinas the second, and Martin Heidegger the
third.
Gamwell builds his alternative to these
theories atop the foundational insight that the
claim “nothing exists” is logically absurd. To
argue, for example, that we can only speak of
the teleological good by means of negation—
as Aquinas seeks to do by establishing an
analogical justification for the existence and
nature of God—is rationally untenable. If one
cannot say something positively univocal
about the nature of the good, then, Gamwell
argues, one is open to the charge either of
articulating nonsense (akin, he says, to
asserting the existence of a “colorless yellow
rose”) or to claiming, implicitly, that “nothing
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exists”—which, Gamwell maintains, is pragmatically self-contradictory. Kant’s wholesale
rejection of the possibility of metaphysical
inquiry on the one hand, and Heidegger’s
rejection of universal reason on the other, do
not escape this critique, either: Gamwell seeks
to demonstrate that both “Noumena” and
“Dasein” are ultimately reducible to the same
contradictory, rationally absurd assertion:
“nothing exists.”
Likewise, Gamwell argues that nonteleological moral theories that seek to makeup for the deficiencies of Kantian ethics by
supplying substantive, positive content to the
categorical imperative—like those advanced
by Alan Gewirth, Jügen Habermas, and KarlOtto Apel—also fail to provide a rationallywarranted foundation for morality because
they commit what Gamwell calls the
“partialistic fallacy”: in seeking to establish
morality independently of any one, telic
purpose, they end up, contradictorily, affirming the existence of one telic purpose: that all
action ought seek to affirm the reality that
there is no telic purpose, which, Gamwell
argues, is a kind of telic purpose itself.
In the wake of rejecting these
alternatives, Gamwell moves to construct his
own theoretical grounding for a rationallywarranted conception of the good, which he
identifies as “neo-classical metaphysics.” His
position is “classical” in that it recognizes the
necessity of metaphysics—and, in particular,
theistic metaphysics—in order to make
rationally justifiable claims about the existence and nature of the good, including the
human good. It is “neo,” on the other hand,
because it rejects the claim common in
classical metaphysics that one can know the
nature of the good by means of negation. In
response, Gamwell seeks to identify positively
and univocally the necessary constitutive
features both of existence itself (what he calls
“metaphysics in the strict sense”) and of
subjectivity itself (what he calls “metaphysics
in the broad sense”). Drawing deeply on the

thought of Alfred North Whitehead and
Charles Hartshorne, he devotes chapters 2 and
3 to precisely, if densely at times, spelling out
this metaphysical vision. This culminates in
the demonstration of the existence of a being
who, in the author’s words, is “an eminently
temporal individual, who from everlasting to
everlasting has existed and will exist as the
ever-changing because of ever-increasing
unifications of whatever has occurred in the
world” (8).
This divine being’s existence and nature,
according to Gamwell, can be demon-strated
by means of rational reflection alone; indeed,
it is this divine being’s very temporality—the
fact that it exists in time—that not only makes
it accessible to human reason, but necessarily
so: each rational person, Gamwell argues, has
a constitutive awareness, at least implicitly, of
the divine being’s existence and totality,
which he calls an “original belief.” It is this
constitutive belief, in turn, that provides the
conceptual grounds for pivoting from
existence itself to the good itself, and in
particular, the human good. By virtue of each
person’s “original belief,” Gamwell contends,
one not only necessarily knows the constitutive nature of existence, but also necessarily
knows it as teleological, and in particular, as
“the concrete realization of unity in diversity”
(11). One knows, in other words, that existence properly understood constitutes the good,
and it is this constitutive knowledge, in turn,
that generates the human capacity not only to
make choices, but to be able to make moral
choices—that is, to choose to act in accordance with the comprehensive good that one
cannot fail to know, or to choose against it.
From and within this metaphysical and
teleological framework, Gamwell then moves
swiftly but deftly in chapter 4 to elaborating
on this conception of moral freedom and
responsibility, which, in turn, he leverages and
refines to demonstrate the existence of what
he calls “social practices.” These practices,
authorized by and derived from the
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teleological nature of the good, include the
foundational principle of “communicative
respect,” by which Gamwell means the recognition that any claim a subject makes to moral
validity—that is, any statement an individual
makes to explain and justify her actions—
implicitly and necessarily affirms the right for
any other subject to contest it and make her
own claims to moral validity. This principle,
Gamwell emphasizes, is implicitly rooted in
the nature of the good but explicitly morally
neutral to competing moral visions. It does,
nevertheless, establish the grounds for basic
human rights.
The principle of communicative respect
also provides the foundation for a
constitutional principle of authentic religious
freedom, according to Gamwell. And it is
here, in the final chapters of the book, where
he moves from discussing social practices
more generally to the justification of democracy more specifically, and in particular, the
possibility of a genuinely religiously neutral
constitution. In an extended and generouslyargued conversation with Jeffrey Stout’s
Democracy and Tradition, Gamwell
highlights the strengths of Stout’s critiques of
what he calls “liberalism” and “the new
traditionalism,” defined, respect-ively, as the
claim that comprehensive visions of the good
do not belong in public discourse at all
(“liberalism”), and as the competing claim
that religiously neutral discourse is impossible
because universal moral reason is a fiction
(the “new traditionalism”). Yet, not
surprisingly, Gamwell ultimately disagrees
with Stout’s contention that the solution to the
standoff is to engage in what Stout calls
“ethics without metaphysics.” One of the
foundational insights Gamwell seeks to
advance in the book is that we cannot,
rationally speaking, cleave the former from
the latter. Happily, however, the metaphysical
reality Gamwell describes, and the nature of
the good he locates within and derives from it
includes the recognition of a rationally-

warranted principal of religious neutrality,
thus solving the problem that Stout, in
Gamwell’s mind, aptly describes but fails to
redress.
Encapsulating Existence and the Good is
uniquely hazardous because Gamwell’s
systematic argument, like the metaphysical
system he so carefully describes, is
meticulously and syllogistically disciplined at
every step, and so defies generalization. Yet
even in summary form it is clear that the
project makes an essential contribution to
contemporary moral theory, both in general
and in relation to the more specific issues of
human rights and the possibility of religiously
neutral democratic discourse. Even if one does
not finish the book convinced of the rationally
demonstrable existence of an all-encompassing temporal being who grows in everincreasing actuality, perhaps the text’s greatest strength is its capacity to illuminate the
rational weaknesses of alternative moral paradigms with unassuming but devastating
precision. Indeed, given that most contemporary ethicists—including both Rawlsian “liberals” and MacIntyrean “traditionalists”—still
appear to agree that Immanuel Kant has had
the final word on the validity of metaphysical
inquiry in general and metaphysical ethical
inquiry more specifically, Gamwell’s work
brilliantly provides a much-needed rejoinder.
Perhaps metaphysics is not dead after all.
Matthew R. Petrusek
The University of Chicago Divinity School
petrusek@uchicago.edu

